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ABSTRACT
MALAKIAN, PEDRAM. The Impact of Generational Experiences on Anti-immigration
Sentiments, Department of Economics. June, 2019.
ADVISOR: Lewis Davis
Immigration is one of the most important issues in our increasingly globalized world.
Every year, millions of people relocate to Europe and United States in an effort to improve the
quality of life for themselves and their family. With this increase in immigration, there has been
an emergence of anti-immigration sentiments which have in turn allowed far right political
parties to gain more power, evident in the British referendum to leave the European Union and
Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States. While most works of literature look
at the current work status, education level and income of an individual in explaining how
anti-immigration sentiments occur, I want to look in more detail at the generational factors that
cause individuals to think this way.
Within The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Benjamin Friedman offers a
theory that people constitute their happiness on comparing it to “benchmark of their own prior
experiences or their parents”. Thus when they believe that their own lives are better, they feel
less need to get ahead and they develop a more open view towards immigrants. Building off of
Friedman’s argument, I ran regressions using GSS data together with several control variable, to
see if Friedman’s argument that anti-immigration sentiments rise as a product of generational
experiences rather than based on current socio-economic status, explains the rise that we have
seen in anti-immigration sentiments. Our results supported some of Friedman’s theory that
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individuals who receive a higher education and make more money than their parents are more
tolerant to immigrants however it also revealed that generational changes do not reflect the entire
story as some generational variables had no impact on our dependent variable.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Immigration has become one of the most important issues in an increasingly globalized
world. Every year, millions of people relocate to Europe and United States in an effort to
improve the quality of life for themselves and their family. This increase in immigration has
caused major policy changes for European and North American countries as they attempt to deal
with the rapid influx of new people within their border. As a result, there has been an emergence
of anti-immigration sentiments which have in turn allowed far right political parties to gain more
power. This is evident in the British referendum to leave the European Union and Donald
Trump’s election as President of the United States. With there being so much backlash against
allowing immigrants into the country, it is important to look at what factors are causing people to
be so strongly opposed to immigration.
Within The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Benjamin Friedman offers a
theory for why anti-immigration sentiments arise. Friedman argues that people are more inclined
to be generous or tolerant towards immigrants when they are getting ahead. People constitute
their happiness on comparing it to “benchmark of their own prior experiences or their parents”
(Friedman 2005, pg 72). Thus when they believe that their own lives, as well their children's
lives, are better, they consequently feel less need to get ahead and they develop a more open
view towards immigrants. By continually giving people a sense of living better than they or their
families have in the past, “sustained growth reduces the intensity of their desire to live better
than one another” (Friedman 2005, pg 75). Once the growth stops however, no matter how
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people’s income have risen, it is only a matter of time before habits adapt and the sense of
heightened well being disappears. When the economy stagnates, the importance people attach to
living better than others who they compare themselves to becomes more intense and that feeling
of openness and generosity decreases.
In this way, Benjamin Friedman argues that anti-immigration sentiments rise as a product
of generational experiences rather than based on current socio-economic status (Friedman 2005,
pg 123). The implication for that is people take on certain basic attitudes in young adulthood,
depending in large part on the economic conditions they experience in these formative years, and
they retain those attitudes throughout the remainder of their lives. During times of economic
stagnation, people who feel that they are living no better, or not much better, than their parents
will search for enemies. As a result, antipathy towards immigrants surfaces with natives looking
to blame immigrants and immigration as the primary factors in causing economic distress. This
negative mentality and expectations can pass through generations causing anti-immigration
sentiments to increase. Once individuals have formed their basic attitudes about such matters,
they are normally very slow to change them even after an economy has begun to grow again.
With many works of literature confirming the idea that anti-immigration sentiments
increase during times of economic downturns, I want to look in more detail at the generational
factors that cause individuals to think this way. Building off of Friedman’s argument regarding
the negative feeling towards immigrants arising from generation to generation, I want to explore
how an individual’s past experiences and history impacts their mentality towards immigrants and
immigration.With immigration being one of the most important issues in today’s world I feel this
is an important topic to look at in further detail. As a result of the Great Britain’s exit from the
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EU and Trump’s election win, other countries such as Brazil, France and Germany have all
experienced a rise in support for far right political parties. This indicates that anti-immigration
sentiments are on the rise thus it is important to research the factors that are impacting this
change in behavior. As well, the results from this paper could have important implications for
public policy as it reveals that although economic growth has been occuring in America, the
growth has not been equally distributed. This would suggest that future policies should focus on
redistribution in order to stop the rise of inequality that has been prevalent within the United
States.


CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW OF U.S IMMIGRATION HISTORY

The United States has been the top destination for international migrants since 1960, with
one-fifth of the world's migrants living there as of 2017 (Zong, Batalova, Hallock 2018, pg ).
More than 43.7 million immigrants resided in the United States in 2016, accounting for 13.5
percent of the total U.S. population of 323.1 million, according to American Community Survey
(ACS) data. Between 2015 and 2016, the foreign-born population increased by about 449,000, or
1 percent, a rate slower than the 2.1 percent growth experienced between 2014 and 2015 (Zong,
Batalova, Hallock 2018). Data on the nativity of the U.S. population were first collected in 1850.
That year, there were 2.2 million immigrants, representing nearly 10 percent of the U.S.
population. Between 1860 and 1920, the immigrant share of the overall population fluctuated
between 13 percent and almost 15 percent, peaking at 14.8 percent in 1890, mainly due to high
levels of immigration from Europe. Due to restrictive immigration laws in 1921 and 1924, along
with the Great Depression and World War II, there was a sharp drop in new arrivals. As a result,
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the foreign-born share steadily declined, hitting a record low of approximately 5 percent in 1970.
Since then, the immigration population has quadrupled reaching 43.7 million in 2016.

CHAPTER III
THEORIES FOR OPPOSITION AGAINST IMMIGRATION
With immigration being such a debated topic in global politics, it is important to look at
the theories that impact public opinion towards immigration. Immigration affects the domestic
landscapes of receiving countries in different ways and there are numerous studies that use
different theoretical explanations for the evolvement of anti-immigration sentiments. The
theories I will look at are group threat theory, competitive threat theory, social identity threat,
social salience and contact theory.
Group Threat Theory
According to the group threat model, presence of an outgroup population prompts fear of
competition over resources. Fear of competition, in turn, is likely to increase prejudice and
hostility toward the outgroup population. Threat or fear of competition over resources is a major
source of anti-immigrant sentiments and their longitudinal change (Kuntz et al. 2017, pg 58).
The population of a country views economic and cultural resources as scarce and limited. Since
immigrants are seen as potential competitors for such resources, they become a threat to the well
being of the populace. The threat is often more evident among the socially and economically
vulnerable groups. Unemployed individuals with low income or low level of education are
particularly vulnerable thus they feel the most threatened by the presence of newcomers. This
threat is fueled by the idea that immigrants take away jobs, exploit the welfare system and
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compete over housing and other social resources. Group threat theory finds that hostility towards
an outgroup population is applicable for non material issues as well such as instances in which
the group feels that their culture and collective identity is being threatened. Natives reaction of
exclusion and prejudice manifest when their collective economic, cultural, or religious interests
are threatened (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, pg 389). This perceived group deprivation can be a
powerful trigger of hostility.. The fear that immigrants could alter the prevailing way of life or
the foundation of national identity can lead to an increase in anti-immigration sentiments.
Competitive Threat Theory
Competitive theory is similar to group threat theory however while group threat theory
focuses on majority group members’ identification with their own group, and on the perceived
threat posed by minority group members, competitive threat theory looks more specifically at
economic conditions. According to competitive threat theory, “harsh economic conditions
prompt people to perceive out-group populations as threats to their lives”. Immigrants are
regarded as competitors who take away opportunities in the labor market. When the economy
grows, inflow of immigrants are not seen as competition as the economy is booming. However
when the economy is on a downward spiral, the competition over scarce resources in the labor
market intensifies. Thus competitive theory suggests that this is likely to increase unfavorable
attitudes towards immigrants. This is because both the size of the immigrant population and the
economic situation are viewed as two major sources of competition over social and economic
resources (Kuntz et al. 2017, pg 232). As rational actors, natives are consistently pursuing their
own self interest thus they often have unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants in order to
legitimate their social positions when competing with foreigners over jobs or residential space.
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This self interest is heightened during times of economic recession (Ceobanu and Escandell
2010, pg 369). Several studies provided support for the thesis that depressed economic
conditions (measured by GNP and unemployment rate) are associated with deeper hostility and
with negative attitudes toward immigrants (Coenders et al., 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et
al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2000, 2006)
Social Identity Theory
The issue of ant-immigration arises as a product of Social identity theory. Social identity
theories argue that people’s sense of who they are stems from what groups they belong to or
identify with (Sniderman et al. 2004, pg 401). This identification often leads to in-group
favouritism and a sense of group superiority which results in the creation of stereotypes (Herbst
and Glynn 2004, pg 68). A person’s positive identification with his or her own group is thought
to be accompanied by a simultaneous process of differentiation from outsiders (Ceobanu and
Escandell 2010, pg 325). Stereotypes reinforce differentiation between other groups and they
create extra boundaries. A common criticism of this theory relates to the actual causal
mechanisms implicating ATII and identities, i.e., whether identities determine attitudes or vice
versa (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, pg 326)
Contact Theory
Ceobanu and Escandell discuss the contact theory as another way of assessing the impact
of individual factors on attitudes towards immigrants. In the form of the “contact hypothesis”,
this perspective builds on Allport’s 1954 proposition that contact generally fosters more
favorable attitudes toward out-group members (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, pg 320). Some
scholars use contact theory as a proposition that the presence of immigrants may in fact reduce
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hostility of the host society members toward immigrants rather than increase it (Kuntz et al.
2017, pg 232). They suggest that contact, which becomes possible when a large number of
immigrants are present, is a very effective means to reduce enmity of the host society toward
newcomers by lowering anxiety and increasing knowledge and empathy toward them. A few
studies have put both group threat and contact theories to test in a single framework. For
example, Schlüter and Wagner (2008) found empirical support for both of them, implying that
the two theories are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. A larger immigrant group
size both increases threat and contact, whereas contact in turn reduces threat. As well, Kwak and
Wallace (2018) use competitive threat theory as the primary theory used in their research of the
effects of economic conditions on anti-immigrant sentiments.
Social Salience
Social Salience is another theory that is used to explore social behavior towards
immigrants. According to Oxtoby (2008), each individual has any number of identities and these
identities can be can be more or less salient at any moment in time. The relative salience of these
identities can significantly affect behavior. There is evidence that priming identities affect
behaviors other than task performance. In an experiment ran by Bargh et al (1996), the authors
reported that priming an African-American stereotype (through subliminal pictures being flashed
on a computer screen as a subject is working on a tedious task) caused non-African-American
participants to react with more hostility to a computer error. Furthermore, research in both
psychology and economics literature has demonstrated that social identity can affect simple
social interactions. Identity has been shown to motivate differential treatment of in-group and
out-group members. Through simple games, Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Akerlof and
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Kranton (2000) found that the violation of in-group norms by in-group members can be seen as a
threat to the identity of the group (Ghatak and Verdier 2017, pg 13). As a result, individuals are
motivated to keep the value of the group identity by punishing the offender. This leads to the
argument that there can be tension between an individual’s social identity and economic interests
and depending on the strength of these identities and their salience. For example a poor person
may not vote for the kind of redistributive policy a purely economic self-interest based argument
would imply (Ghatak and Verdier 2017, pg 17)
Building off this argument, Ghatak and Verdier use the Bus Stop example to link the
social salience of an individual to economic factors. The argument is that in a crowded bus,
people tend to direct their rage at new passengers who keep on boarding, and want the bus to
stop at as few stops as possible, but do not ask why there are so few buses (Ghatak and Verdier
2017). Since ethnic identity is identifiable, it is much easier to blame an identifiable group such
as immigrants as opposed to blaming the invisible hands of the market. Taking the bus example
as a metaphor for economic opportunity, as growth slows down, people are more likely to use
immigrants as scapegoats whose ethnic and cultural differences now seem more salient

CHAPTER IV
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
IMMIGRATION
The previous section gave an overview of theories that attempt to explain why there can
be negative attitudes towards immigration. Many of those theories are impacted by economic
determinants. Often times, hostility towards immigrants is increased in times where there is
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competition over resources and economic concerns. This section will look at various economic
factors such as globalisation, economic growth, employment status and competition of public
goods in order to determine the impact that economic factors have on driving negative attitudes
and opposition towards immigration.
Globalisation
With immigration being such a hot topic, many works of literature have looked at the
economic factors that impact people’s view towards immigration. Within Montserrat Guibernau
(2010), Guibernau argues that one of the driving factors for the increase in anti-immigration
sentiments, and in turn the rise in the Far right, has been the rise of globalisation. The process of
globalisation is having a “major impact on the lives of individuals who see consumption,
production, leisure, media, education, travel and politics affected by increasing interdependence
and speed in communications and technological developments” (Gibernau 2010, pg 5 ). As a
result, the impact of globalisation can affect people's experience of the economy and politics.
The rise in new radical parties are reflective of “the insecurity and instability brought about by
rapid social and economic changes and a technological revolution that has resulted in the
restructuring of the world economy” (Guibernau 2010, pg 7). The shift in manufacturing from
industrialized societies to developing one's, where production is cheaper and labor regulations
less strict, creates a sense of vulnerability for those who might lose their job. While a successful
elite benefits from operating in this global flexible market, a growing number of low and
medium-skilled workers begin to have lower self esteem and they develop a perception that
immigrants are coming to their country to steal their jobs.
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Guibernau (2010) argues that globalisation contributes to cultural anxiety for people who
are concerned that their culture and language might disappear. An example being the French who
“are extremely preoccupied about the predominance of English worldwide and, in particular, by
the progressive displacement of the use of French within EU institutions as well as the
introduction of English expressions into the French language” (Guibernau 2010, pg 6). This
feeling of vulnerability and fear can often turn into hostility, xenophobia and racism against
those regarded as different (Guibernau 2010, pg 12). A significant number of nations and ethnic
groups share a genuine concern about the possible eventual disappearance of their cultures and
languages, Guibernau argues that the new radical right has been able to capture these feelings of
security and uncertainty and “has addressed them through a political discourse based on
underlying the distinction between those who belong and the “others” (Guibernau 2010, pg 6).
“In addition, the pervasive threat of terrorism since 9/11 is also associated with “outsiders”,
people who do not “belong” even if they are citizens” (Guibernau 2010, pg 6). This has caused
the emergence of ethnic nationalism with this need to “preserve national identity against foreign
influence” (Guibernau 2010, pg 9)
Economic Growth and anti-immigration sentiments
It is often thought that increasing signs of xenophobia are caused by changing economic
conditions over time. The belief is that public attitudes towards immigrants and immigration
become more positive in good economic times and more negative in economic downturns. This
belief is motivated by competitive threat theory which suggests that deteriorating economic
conditions intensify economic competitions with immigrants for scarce resources such as jobs
and welfare benefits which contributes to increased anti-immigration sentiments . Wallace and
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Kwak look at the impact of adverse economic conditions on anti-immigration attitudes by
investigating the impact of the Great Recession on perceived immigrant threat. As the worst
economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Great Recession of 2007–2010
disrupted economic security, social status, and ways of life of millions of citizens (Wallace and
Kwak, pg 4). Couple this time of economic downturn with the increase in immigration and the
result is a large number of native workers becoming nervous about their economic situation
“causing them to project their fears and anxieties onto immigrants and triggering support for
anti-immigrant policies” (Kwak and Wallace, pg 4).
For their dependent variable, Kwak and Wallace used the Perceived Immigrant threat
(PIT) which measures respondents sense of threat from the presence of immigrants in their
country. he first six questions ask respondents’ how much they agree or disagree with the
following statements: “(1) Immigrants increase crime rates; (2) Immigrants are generally good
for [COUNTRY’S] economy; (3) Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in
[COUNTRY]; (4) Immigrants improve [COUNTRY’S NATIONALITY] society by bringing
new ideas and cultures; (5) Legal immigrants to [COUNTRY] who are not citizens should have
the same rights as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizens; (6) [COUNTRY] should take
stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.” The seventh question asks: (7) “Do you think
the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be: 1 = increased a lot, 2 =
increased a little, 3 = remain the same as it is, 4 = reduced a little, 5 = reduced a lot?. In their
analysis, they found that levels of PIT were positively associated with age, being a citizen and
being unemployed. These results are consistent with past research on anti-immigration
sentiment. They conclude that respondents confronted with economic strain display a more
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negative attitude towards immigrants and that racial prejudices and high local concentration of
foreigners are associated with a stronger anti-foreigner sentiment. They also found that their data
supported the rapid immigration influx hypothesis such that that anti-immigrant sentiments
increase when the immigrant population increases quickly in a short period of time.
In his paper, Joakim Ruist looks further at this relationship between economic growth and
anti-immigration sentiments. For this study, Ruist regressed an analysis of how variation in
macroeconomic conditions influenced the variation in attitudes to immigration over time within
23 European countries that were observed biannually 2002-2012. The primary measure of
attitudes to immigration was obtained from the survey question: (1) Is [country] made a worse or
a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Answers were coded on
a 0-10 scale with 10 being the most positive reply. The question thus represents an overall
assessment about the respondents’ perception of whether immigration is bad or good for their
country. Three indicators were used as macro-level variables to measure business cycle variation.
Those indicators were real GDP per capita growth rate, the unemployment rate and government
debt. Ruist’s results indicated that attitudes to immigration become more positive when growth
increases, unemployment decreases, or government debt decreases. Furthermore, the results
supported previous studies that claimed attitudes to immigration are more negative among less
educated, unemployed, and older individuals
Impact of Employment Status on anti-immigrant sentiment
Building off of the competitive theory that when economic conditions deteriorate,
negative attitudes towards immigrants rise, Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov looked at the
relationship between employment status and anti-immigration sentiments. The belief is that that
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people feel much more vulnerable about their employment status and income status during times
of economic downturn and, as a result, will be much less tolerant towards immigrants and
newcomers. More specifically, unemployed individuals with low (perceived) income or low
level of education are particularly vulnerable and, thus, threatened by competition due to
newcomer. These feelings are thought to be enhanced during times of economic downturn.
Kunts, Davidov and Semyonov wanted to test this theory by analyzing two rounds of the
European Social Survey with data from before 2006 and after 2010, the peak of the European
Economic crisis. Their work was based on Competitive Threat Theory and and Group Threat
model. Using theoretical models and previous studies, Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov made
three hypothesis for their paper: At the individual level, they expected that the lower the
perceived income of the individual, the stronger the negative attitude towards immigrants.
Relying on the group threat theory, they expected that rising unemployment to result in more
negative attitudes towards immigrants. Finally, they expected rising aggregate levels of
subjective income insecurity to result in more negative attitudes toward immigrants.
Their final results showed that anti-immigrant sentiments increased in countries where
perceptions of economic insecurity also increased. Anti-immigrant sentiments decreased in
countries where perceptions of economic insecurity declined. Their data revealed that
country-level anti-immigrant attitudes and mean levels of perceived income insecurity are highly
and significantly 17 correlated in both 2006 (r = .745) and 2010 (r = .840), indicating that
countries with higher perceived income insecurity tend to show higher levels of anti-immigrant
attitudes both before and after the crisis. The results of the analysis suggest that, on average,
country average anti-immigrant sentiments tend to be less pronounced in prosperous countries
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and more pronounced in countries where economic conditions are suppressed. The data analysis
provided firm support for the expectation that individuals who feel less secure with their income
are more likely to have negative attitudes toward immigrants.
Impact of Skill and Unskilled labor on Anti-immigration Sentiments
Looking further into this relationship, Mayda (2001) along with O’Rourke and Sinnott
(2004) looked at the impact of skill distributions of native and foreign workers on
anti-immigration sentiments. They found that low skilled or less educated individuals in
developed countries have stronger anti-immigration sentiments. This is due to the fact that most
immigrants to these countries are low skilled as well. Their presence increases the competition
within this sector of the labor market which in turn decreases the wage of low skilled natives and
increases their risk of unemployment. O’Rourke and Sinnott made a prediction in their paper that
the impact of skills on anti-immigrant sentiment should be related to a country’s GDP per capita
(O’rourke and Sinnott 2010) In the richest countries, being high-skilled should have a negative
impact on anti-immigrant sentiment. In the poorest countries, being high-skilled should have a
positive impact on anti-immigrant sentiment. In rich countries skilled workers favor both trade
and immigration, while unskilled workers are protectionist and anti-immigration. In poor
countries, it is the unskilled who are liberal in their attitudes towards both trade and immigration,
while the skilled favor both protection and immigration restrictions.
Cerna and Haynes (2010) look at the changes in high skilled immigration policies that
have occured in the past decades within Europe. As a result of globalisation, there has been an
increase in demand for high skilled labor and an increase in competition for finding the best and
brightest. Having said that, in times in times of economic downturn and shock such as the global
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economic crisis of 2008-2009, it usually “tightens its labour policies and begin to propose or
implement more restrictive high skilled immigration (HSI) policies” (Cerna and Haynes 2010, pg
15). These policy changes included reducing numerical limits/ quotas, as well as shortage lists,
reinforcing labour market tests, making it difficult to renew work permits, limiting
non-discretionary flows (e.g. family reunification, work permits for spouses) and encouraging
return-migration (Cerna and Haynes 2010, pg 11). Labour market competition intensifies when
unemployment rates increase and economic growth decreases because native and immigration
labour forces are placed “in more direct competition than in periods of economic prosperity”
(Cerna and Haynes 2010, pg 10). Many politicians and people justify restrictive immigration
policies by looking at the unemployment rate yet according to Cerna and Haynes that is a lack of
understanding regarding the mismatch of labour demand and supply. Thus although the highly
skilled immigrant workers are taking jobs that there is a shortage of, they are still perceived as
competition by non immigrants. The perception of labour migrants can be negative even if native
workers are employed.
Immigration and Competition of Public Goods
Another economic factor that causes an increase in anti-immigration sentiments is the
fear that immigrants burden public finances through intensive use of public services (Dustmann
and Preston 2004, pg 11). One one hand, some natives fear that they will lose their job to
immigrants. On the other hand, many natives fear having to carry the costs of more immigrants
using social services. This leaves immigrants in a lose-lose situation in the public eye as they are
either taking away jobs or free riding on benefits provided by the state. The anti-immigrant
sentiment is motivated by fears that immigration will increases the natives’ tax burden
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(Meseguer and Kemmerling 2018). Especially among high income natives, there is a fear that
government will respond to increasing inflows of immigrants by raising taxes and leave social
benefits untouched. If this is the formula policy makers choose, high-income natives should
exhibit “the strongest opposition to immigrants having access to social services, particularly if
immigrants are predominantly low-skilled” (Meseguer and Kemmerling 2018). Meseguer and
Kemmerling found that dude to the fear of having to pay higher taxes as a result of high
immigration rates, rich natives would be less likely to support immigration in states with high
fiscal exposure. If policy makers choose to not increase taxes in response to increase in
immigration flows, anti-immigration sentiments would still rise as now natives would be
competing with immigrants for the same amount of social benefits.
Similar to the work done by Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov (2017), Meseguer and
Kemmerling find that the natives perception of the impact of immigrants on public goods
depends on their income. Since high-skilled immigrants do not crow out poor natives in the use
of social services, rich natives will be in favor of skilled immigrants more than poor natives will
be (Meseguer and Kemmerling 2010). If the natives fear being crowded out of the social
services, then poor natives will be against unskilled immigrants more intensely than rich natives.
Thus in states that are highly fiscally exposed, poor natives are significantly less likely to support
unskilled immigration than in states with low exposure (Meseguer and Kemmerling 2010).
To conclude, it is evident that economic concerns play a pivotal role in driving negative
attitudes towards immigration. Globalisation has caused people to feel afraid and vulnerable
about their job security. These feelings can quickly turn into xenophobia and racism towards
newcomers as there is a belief that immigrants are the ones that are taking their jobs. In times of
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economic downturn, these xenophobic and racist thoughts are exemplified. This is due to the fact
that during these periods resources are more scarce and immigrants are perceived as competition
and a threat. Furthermore Kuntz et al (2017) showed that in countries where perceptions of
economic insecurity are high, anti-immigration sentiments are increased. This reinforces the
notion that when economic conditions deteriorate, negative attitudes towards immigrants rise.

CHAPTER V
MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Within the Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Benjamin Friedman discusses the
idea that despite the benefits of economic growth (such as rise in standard of living, less poverty
and hunger, less disease), many people are uncomfortable with economic growth. With greater
affluence comes better food, bigger house, more travel and improved medical care, many of
these advantages lie mostly in the material realm. For Friedman, economic growth rarely means
simply more. “The qualitative changes that accompany economic growth such as changes in
work arrangement, in power structures have always generated resistance” (Friedman 2006, pg
20). Nevertheless, “economic growth often leads to a rise in standard of living for the majority of
citizens which results in greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility and
commitment to fairness” (Friedman 2006, pg 21).
Although everybody wants to make more income as to enjoy a higher standard of living,
better health and a greater sense of security, people’s happiness isn’t always associated with a
higher income. What constitutes as “more” for people is relative and is based on them comparing
their lives to some kind of reference point. When doing this comparison, individuals look at two
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benchmarks:their own (or their family’s) past experience and how they see people living around
them. When people are getting ahead, they are more inclined to be generous or tolerant to
newcomers. Happiness of course isn't solely dependent on income however people with higher
income typically have better educations and a stronger sense of security in the face of major life
uncertainties. Economic growth allows people to feel better off as they are doing better
compared to their previous benchmark. If people feel that they are living better than their past,
their desire to liver better than other is greatly reduced. Once the growth stops however, no
matter how people’s income have risen, it is only a matter of time before habits adapt and the
sense of heightened well being disappears. When the economy stagnates, the importance people
attach to living better than others who they compare themselves to becomes more intense. It is
often people in the lower half of the income distribution, not the very poor but semiskilled
workers, who react most defensively when an economy stagnates.
For Friedman, economic growth or stagnation affect a society’s character. “This dynamic
relationship reflects the process by which public attitudes form, before they result in new
legislation or other changes in government” (Friedman 2006, pg 92). Once individuals have
formed their basic attitudes about such matters, they are normally very slow to change them. The
implication for that is people take on “certain basic attitudes in young adulthood, depending in
large part on the economic conditions they experience in these formative years, and they retain
those attitudes throughout the remainder of their lives” (Friedman 2006, pg 98). What matters is
not whether people’s income and living standards have increased compared to the year before or
even the year before that, but whether the average citizen can see progress over the last decade or
the last generation . For individuals it is important to have a sense of getting ahead compared to
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how their parents lived, and whether their experience gives them confidence that their children
will do even better. For example the decade and a half following the Civil War brough exuberant
economic growth that meant rapidly rising incomes for most Americans. “This led to a period of
awareness of progress and an appreciation of individual opportunity leading to Congress
sponsoring the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which forbid discrimination based on race in a variety of
public and private activities” (Friedman 2006, pg 130).
Friedman’s theories directly apply to attitudes towards immigration as one could argue
that individuals who feel that they have not gotten ahead compared to their parents, would
display more negative attitudes towards immigration as they would see immigrants as a possible
reason for their inability to attain upward mobility. In this way, Friedman’s theory regarding
economic growth builds off of many of the economic determinants that were discussed in earlier
sections. For example, previous papers argued that during times of economic downturn or
stagnation, negative attitudes towards immigrants increase. This theory goes in hand with
Friedman’s argument as he argued that during these periods, people don’t feel like they are
getting ahead which can cause them to feel insecure. If individuals feel like they are not doing
better, they are going to be far less tolerant of newcomers. In these periods of economic
downturn, resources are scarce and immigrants are seen as a threat and competition whereas in
times of economic prosperity, people are more likely to be welcoming and generous towards
newcomers.
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CHAPTER VI
THE DATA
The data for this paper will come from the General Social Survey. It is cross sectional
cumulative data from 1972 to 2016. My dependent variable for measuring people’s view on
immigration will be Letin1 f rom the General Social Survey however it will be renamed as
Anti-immigration f or my regressions in order to be able to analyze the coefficient more
effectively. The higher the coefficient, the more individuals are displaying anti-immigration
sentiments The variable asks people “Do you think the number of immigrants to America
nowadays should be…?” to which respondents punch in answer of 1 to 4 with 1 being increased
a lot and 4 being reduced a lot. I renamed this variable to anti-immigration a s the variable is
intended to measure the people’s preference over immigration flows thus a higher number
coefficient for that variables indicates higher anti-immigration sentiments.
The constant independent variable that I used for an individual was region, gender and
race.
Region: This variable ask respondent what region he/she is from. The answers range from 1 to 9.
1 is New England, 2 - Middle Atlantic, 3 - East Coast Central, 4 - West North Central, 5 - South
Atlantic, 6 - East South Central, 7 - West South Central, 8 - Mountain, 9 - Pacific.
Age: This variable measures the responder’s age. Answers range from 1 representing 10-19 years
to 8 which is 80 years and above.
Gender: Responders answer 1 if they identify as a male and 2 if they identify as a female.
Race: R
 esponders were asked what race they consider themselves. The responses were 1 to 3
with 1 being white, 2 being black and 3 being other.
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The independent variables that I looked at to measure current economic status are marital
status, education levels, occupational prestige level and income.
Marital: The respondent is asked about his/her current marital status. Answers range from 1 to 4
with 1 being legally married, 2 being in a civil union or registered domestic partnership, 3 being
separated and 4 being not currently married or in a civil union or registered domestic partnership
Educ: The responder is asked about his/her education level. Answers range from 0 which is no
formal schooling to 20 which is 8 years of formal schooling
Realinc: The respondent is asked how much income they have earned
Incom16: Thinking about the time when you were 16 years old, compared with American
families in general then, would you say your family income was? Answers range from 1-5: far
below average (1), below average (2), average (3), above average (4), or far above average (5)?
Paeduc: Respondents are asked on the level of education that their father received. Answers
range from 0 which is no formal schooling to 20 which is 8 years of formal schooling.
Maeduc: Same as above except respondents are asked about their mother’s level of education
Prestg10: R
 espondents are asked about their occupation prestige score. Answers range from 0 to
100 with 0 being the lowers prestige score and 100 being the highest.
Papres10: Respondents are asked about the occupation prestige score of their father. Answers
are calculated in the range from 0-100 similar to Prestg10
Mapres10: Respondents are asked about the occupation prestige score of their mother. Answers
range from 0 to 100 again.

24

CHAPTER VII
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
To view factors that might have an impact on people’s response to the immigration
question (variable anti-immigration) , the variable will be regressed against other social and
cultural variables. The equation for the regression will be:
Anti − I mmigration = α + βXit + δR + γ + κZit + εt
The coefficient α will be the constant factors such as age, age squared, gender. If the coefficient
for age is large and positive we expect that the older individuals are, the more they are opposed
to immigrants entering the country. X is the social variables such as income, level of education
and marital status. Based off of other papers, we would expect that individuals with low income
and low level of education will be more opposed to immigration thus we would assume that the
coefficients for income and level of education to be negative. Coefficient R will be the regional
variable. This will look at how people from different regions of United States will respond to
immigration. Coefficient γ represents the cultural variables which will be religion. I will look at
two variables, (relig) which looks at the religion that individuals associate themselves with and
(attend) which looks at how often individuals attend religious events.
The coefficient Z will be the generational variables I will look at. I want to use these
variables to look at the impact of generational changes on individual’s attitudes towards
immigration. The first generational change to look at is the generational change in income.
Friedman’s getting ahead theory is based on economic growth and he associates growth with an
increase in income. The variable for generational change in income is incz and is calculated by
subtracting Realinc, the current income level of the respondent subtracted by incom16 which is
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how much the respondents parents were earning when he/she was 16. We would predict that if
people are making more money now than what their parents were making, then that individual
will be more tolerant towards immigrants as that individual feels like they have achieved upward
mobility.
Geneducm i s the generational change in education for a man. It is calculated by
subtracting the education level of the individual’s father by the individual’s current level of
education. Geneducf is the generational change in education for a female and it is calculated by
subtracting the education level of the individual’s mother by the current individual’s current
level of education. Gened_pa measures the generational change in education between the
individual and both of his parents If an individual has received a higher education than their
parents, their result will be positive for this algorithm and therefore we would expect them to be
more open to immigration policies as they’re in a better position than their parents were.
Similarly if an individual’s result is negative, that means they have received a lower education
than their parents thus it is more likely that they would develop more anti-immigration
sentiments.
General change in prestige is an important variable to look at since changes in
occupational prestige can indicate upward mobility as well. An individual could be earning less
than their parents however if they are working at job with a higher occupational prestige ranking
they will still feel like they have achieved upward mobility. Sociologists have identified prestige
rankings for more than 700 occupations based on results from a series of national surveys. They
created a scale with 0 being the lowest possible score to 100 being the highest, and then ranked
the occupations based on the results of the survey Generational change in prestige for man is
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identified as prestigem a nd is calculated by subtracting the man’s current occupation’s level of
prestige prestg10 minus the prestige of his dad’s occupation papres10. G
 enerational change in
occupation prestige for a women is identified as prestigef. It is calculated by subtracting the
women’s current occupation’s level of prestige prestg10 minus the prestige of her mom’s
occupation mapres10.
CHAPTER VIII
DATA ANALYSIS
In this section, I run regressions to see how different variables impact the response of
individuals towards the dependent variable, anti-immigration. The first regression is a baseline
regression that looks at the current socio-economic status and demographic variables that
impacts people’s anti-immigration sentiments. The baseline regression shows if the data supports
the theories that we explored in the literature review. Theories such as, are unemployed or
uneducated individuals more likely to be more hostile to immigrants. After the baseline
regression, I run regressions with the generational variables in order to see if Friedman’s “getting
ahead” theory is supported in the data. Friedman uses change in income as an indicator for
economic progress thus I will run regressions using the generational change in income. To test
other generational variables that can indicate upward mobility, I run regressions with the
generational change in education along with the generational change in occupational prestige. By
looking at three different variations of generational variables, we can get a more in depth look of
how generational changes can impact an individual's views towards immigration.
Table 1 displays the baseline regression for an individual’s response to the letin variable
from the GSS survey. The Letin variable has been renamed anti-immigration within these
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regressions in order to be able to read the coefficient with more ease. A higher coefficient for
anti-immigration means that individuals want less immigrants entering the country. For the first
regression, we are looking at current socio economic components along with demographic
factors of an individual and how different variables impact the individual’s response to the letin
question. To account for different levels of anti-immigration sentiments than can rise in specific
years and in specific regions, I ran the regression with interaction variables between year and
region. For example in the New York region, anti-immigration sentiments might be higher in
2001 as a result of 9/11 than any other parts of the United States thus the interaction variable can
account for that.
The results for the baseline regression results differ from the theories presented by Mayda
(2001), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2004) along with Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov (2017) within
the literature review. They had found that low skilled and unemployed individuals in developed
countries have stronger anti-immigration sentiments as they believe that immigrants will take
their jobs. Within my regression however, those who were unemployed displayed a statistically
significant negative coefficient for anti-immigration indicating that they are more open to
immigrants entering the country. Those who are housekeepers displayed a negative coefficient
indicating that they are more open to immigrants. This could possibly be due to the fact that they
feel their job is quite safe and will most likely not be replaced by immigrants. The results for
education however do fit previous theory. (Kuntz et al. 2017) present the theory that individuals
who have a lower level of education feel particularly vulnerable and as a result feel threatened by
the presence of newcomers The coefficient education in my regression was negative and
statistically significant which indicates that an extra year of education causes individuals to be
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more tolerant towards immigrants. Those who receive a higher level of education are less likely
to feel threatened by newcomers as the jobs that they are going after are not always the jobs
provided to new immigrants within the country. The variable for income is realinc. The
coefficient for realinc i s negative which fits the theory presented by Kuntz, Davidov and
Semyonov (2017). At the individual level, Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov had expected that the
lower the perceived income of the individual, the stronger the negative attitude towards
immigrant thus a higher perceived income should correlate with a more positive attitude towards
immigrants. The negative coefficient for realinc means that those with higher income, feel less
vulnerable and are more likely to be open towards immigrants.
Another important coefficients to look at is race. For both variables of race, the
coefficients were statistically significant with individuals who identified as blacks and other
races reporting a negative coefficient. This means that both group of people are more tolerant
towards immigrants. This could be due to the fact that both groups of people feel like they are
facing anti-immigration sentiments as a result of group threat theory. That sense of struggling
from the same obstacles and a feeling of unity could possibly be the reason that blacks and other
races display lower anti-immigration sentiments. Another important coefficient to note is that
individuals who are not married also displayed a negative coefficient indicating a less hostile
outlook towards immigrants. The coefficient of age was statistically significant with a positive
coefficient indicating that the higher the age of individuals, the more hostile they are towards
immigrants. This could be due to the fact that the older generation might be more conservative
and more inclined to stick to their traditional beliefs.
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Table 3 displays the generational change in income for an individual through the variable
incz. The coefficient for the generational change in income is statistically insignificant which
differs from the theory presented by Friedman. According to Friedman, individuals whose are
currently making more than what their parents were making when they were 16 should feel like
they are getting ahead which results in a greater tolerance of diversity. Yet the data in table 3
displays that generational change in income does not have a large impact on people’s
anti-immigration sentiment. Part of this reason could be issues with the data for income16. Many
individuals at 16 might not know how much their parents are making as financial matters are a
private matter in many households.
Table 4 presents the impact of the generational change in education on the
anti-immigration variable. The three key variables to be looking at are geneducm, geneducf and
gened_pa. The coefficient for geneducf is statistically significant and negative indicating that
females who receive a higher education than their mother, are more open to immigrants. As well,
the coefficient for education is -0.0385 which means that an extra year of education causes
females to be 0.0385 less hostile towards immigrants. As indicated by the negative gened_pa
coefficient, individuals who receive a higher education level than both of their parents are less
hostile to immigrants as well. These results fit the “getting ahead” theory presented by Benjamin
Friedman in the literature review section. When individuals are receiving a higher education than
their parents, especially females who are receiving a higher education than their mothers, they
have a sense of getting ahead compared to how their parents lived, and this gives them
confidence that their children will do even better. This confidence means that these individuals
feel less vulnerable to outsiders and are more likely to be open to immigrants. The results for
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generational change in education is likely higher for females as they have achieved much higher
upward mobility in the past decades when compared to men. Women had high labor market
participation during World War II and the feminist movement of 1960s allowed women to enter
the workforce in great numbers. In this way, most women have experienced a much higher level
of education than their mother as they have had more opportunities available to them. Men have
traditionally always been in the workforce and have been able to achieve higher level of
education thus men are more likely to feel like they are not getting ahead.
Table 5 displays the generational change in prestige of an individual's occupation. Within
the GSS, each occupation has a level of prestige associated with it, the numbers ranging from 0
being the lowest to 100 being the highest level of prestige. With the generational change in
income being statistically insignificant, I thought that the generational difference in prestige
could display a bigger impact on an individual's feeling of getting ahead. For example an
individual can be doing a job that is earning him/her less money than her parents but the job’s
prestige level is deemed higher so that individual might still feel that he/she is achieving upward
mobility. While the coefficient for prestigem is statistically significant and is positive, it doesn’t
appear to have a huge impact on an individual’s anti-immigration sentiments. Having said that,
since the coefficient is not negative, it means that men who are currently working a job more
prestigious than their dads, are against immigrants entering the country.
Friedman’s theory that individuals who feel that they are doing better than their parents
are more likely to be more tolerant towards immigrants, was only supported in the generational
change in education with the largest impact coming from generational change in education for
females. Females who are attaining a higher education than their mothers, did show to be more
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tolerant towards immigrants by displaying a statistically significant negative coefficient. The
generational change in education for both parents was also negative further supporting
Friedman's theory. Friedman’s “getting ahead” theory was initially about generational change in
income however our data reported statistically insignificant coefficient for changes in income
meaning that the change in income had minimal impact on an individual’s anti-immigration
sentiments. This could however be due to the fact that many individuals at the age of 16 do not
have knowledge of how much their parents are earning. Many households keep financial matters
private in contrast to education level or even occupational prestige. It is far more likely that an
individual at 16 knows if his/her parents went to college or where they are employed as opposed
to how much income they are earning. The generational change in prestige of occupation for
males was statistically significant and positive which indicates that men who are currently
employed at job that has a higher prestige than their father’s job, are less tolerant towards
immigrants. This goes against Friedman’s theory as those who are doing better than their parents,
in this case employed a job with a higher prestige than what their father did for a living, should
theoretically be more tolerant towards immigrants.
 CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Friedman’s getting ahead theory provided an interesting perspective to look at when
determining what factors can cause anti-immigration sentiments to rise. His theory is based on
looking at an individual’s past and where they come from as opposed to strictly looking at
current socioeconomic status. While the generational change in education fit Friedman’s theory,
the results from the other generational variables told a different picture. Generational change in
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income ended up being insignificant and generational change in occupational prestige revealed a
theory opposite to Friedman in the sense that males who are employed in a job with a higher
prestige than their father’s displayed more anti-immigration sentiments. These results indicate
that generational factors are not as important in impacting people’s anti-immigration sentiments
especially for males. The data for men showed that even those who achieved upward mobility
compared to their parents, maintained the same level of anti-immigration sentiments. This means
that many individuals develop their view towards immigration at a young age and likely hold
onto the same beliefs when they get older regardless of how much upward mobility they achieve.
That would indicate current socio-economic status and demographic factors could still be a better
indicator of an individual's anti-immigration sentiments.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Size and Share of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1970-2016

Table 2. Individual's response to GSS Survey
(2)
VARIABLES

Part time

anti
immigration

-0.103***
(0.0299)

Temp not working

0.0535
(0.0619)

Unemployed/laid off

-0.0117
(0.0476)

Retired

-0.0659*
(0.0337)

School

-0.119**

35

(0.0526)
Keeping House

-0.0526
(0.0324)

Other

0.0846
(0.0592)

Married

-0.00589
(0.0385)

Widowed

0.0207
(0.0266)

Divorced

-0.0956*
(0.0498)

Never Married

-0.124***
(0.0266)

childs

0.00738
(0.00646)

age

0.00276***
(0.000798)

educ

-0.0448***
(0.00339)

sex

0.0357*
(0.0188)

black

-0.218***
(0.0273)

other

-0.594***
(0.0337)

realinc

-4.61e-07
(3.11e-07)
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Constant

4.343***
(0.153)

Observations

13,881

R-squared

0.084
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2 Notes: Baseline Regression with interaction variables between Year and region

Table 3. Generational Change in Income

Table 3 Notes: Generational change in income. Controlling for year, region, marital status,
number of children, work status and race
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Table 4. Generational Change in Education

Table 4 notes: Generational Education variable. Controlling for year, region, marital status,
number of children, work status and race.
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Table 5. Generational Change in Prestige

Table 5 notes: Generational Occupation Prestige. Controlling for year, region, marital status,
number of children, work status and race.
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Table 6. Summary Statistic of Variables.
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